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TAXING THE COLLEGES
John H. Myers*
INTRODUCTION

The present financial plight of American colleges and universities
is not an acute non-recurring illness but the aggravation of a chronic
condition of many years standing. In fact, educational institutions,
particularly those supported by private funds, have for some years now
been conditioned to operating on deficits. In some cases, the institutions affected have attempted to meet deficiencies by appealing to alumni
and friends. Princeton University, for example, raises through its
alumni more than one-half million dollars each year to meet the operating losses of the university. In other instances, private universities have been forced to modify their charters and become public institutions subject to state control in order to obtain the benefit of public
funds. This source of income was an important factor in Rutgers becoming the state university of New Jersey.
In seeking to meet this very serious problem, some educational institutions have in the past lent their tax-exempt status to private business with resultant benefit to the individual business and to the institution concerned.' Although the occasions were few when universities
were utilized by private corporations as a means of avoiding taxes, the
notoriety of these few instances had by 1950 made substantial impression on the American public and consequently on Congress.' Serious
objection was voiced by organizations and industries that suffered taxwise in the competition with businesses benefiting from the tax status
of exempt institutions.
At the same time other tax-exempt entities were coming under close
and critical scrutinyY It was commonly felt, and with good reason, that
foundations were, in fact, being financed by the Federal Government for
purposes other than charitable or scientific. By placing in one a large
block of non-voting stock, Henry Ford was able to retain for his family control of the motor company which bears his name. The manipu* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 390,
for biographical data.
I See Note, Criticised Uses of Federal Tax Exemption Privileges by Charitable Founda.tions and Educationl Institutions, 98 U. or PA. L. Rv. 696 (1950).
2 See Note, Open Season on Tax Loopholes-Should Section 101 be Modified, 38 GEo.
L. 3. 620 (1950).
3 Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance and Business Expediency, 35 VA. L.
REv. 809, 987 (1949).
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lations of the Textron Trust left a visible taint of tax avoidance and
4
unfair competition.
The Eightieth Congress's Committee on Ways and Means made a
lengthy study of alleged abuses of tax exemption. Although its report
was in many ways critical of exempt institutions, no revision of the
tax statute was attempted. This became the task of the Eighty-first
Congress-first, to compensate for a reduction in excise taxes, and then
to provide a source of revenue for the anticipated expenses of the
Korean conflict.
THE FEEDER CoRPORATION-A TAX EXEMPT BusiNEss
No reason is apparent to us why Congress should wish to deny exemption
to a corporation organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable
purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if the corporation itself administers
the charity.5
It should be inferred from the foregoing excerpt that the tax
status of business enterprises operated by or benefiting tax-free institutions has long been legally settled. In fact the opposite is the
case, and the confusion in the decisions obtains to this day. Insofar
as colleges and universities are concerned, the problems have now been
resolved by statute.
The law in this field stems from two decisions: Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden,6 decided by the Supreme Court in 1927, and Roche's Beach v.
Comm'r 7 decided in 1938 by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The issue in both instances was the extent of exemption granted
charitable, educational and other similar organizations by the tax
statutes. The pertinent section of the Code, has existed virtually unmodified throughout the life of the Federal income tax. It reads:
Sec. 101. Exemptions fram Tax on Corporations.
"Except as provided in paragraph (12) (B) and in supplement U, the
following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter ....
(6) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
4 See President Truman's Special Tax Message to Congress, January 23, 1950, N. Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1950, p. 14, col. 3; Note, 98 U. or PA. L. Rav. 696, 702 (1950), discussing
criticized uses of federal tax exemption privileges by charitable foundations and educational institutions.
5 Roche's Beach v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938).
6 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
7 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
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any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation. For loss of exemption under certain circumstances,
see sections 3813 and 3814; (Italics supplied to indicate recent amendments.)
In the Trinidad case, the Court was asked to decide whether a religious order in the Philippines was taxable on dividends, interest and
rents from its large holdings in the islands, as well as on income from
occasional sales of wine, chocolate and other articles to members of the
order's own organizations or agencies. Justice Van Devanter had little
difficulty in disposing of the Government's contention insofar as it regarded income from rents, dividends and interest. He noted that:
In using ... [its] properties to produce the income, it [the order] therefore is adhering to and advancing . . . its] purposes and not stepping
aside from them or engaging in a business pursuit.,
In truth, to have held otherwise would have been a recognized absurd-

ity.
In disposing of the question as to small trade in wine, chocolate and
other articles, the Court noted:
we think they [the transactions] do not amount to engaging in trade
in any proper sense of the term. It is not claimed that there is any selling
to the public or in competition with others. The articles are merely bought
and supplied for use within the plaintiff's own organization and agencies,--some of them for strictly religious use and the others for uses which
are purely incidental to the work which the plaintiff is carrying on. That
the transactions yield some profit is in the circumstances a negligible factor. Financial gain is not the end to which they are directed.9 (Emphasis
added).
Unfortunately, for the future clarity of the law, the Court, in discussing the general problem involved, made use of the following
language:
...

In effect, the [Government's] contention puts aside as immaterial the
fact that the income from the properties is devoted exclusively to religious, charitable and educational purposes, and also the fact that the
limited trading, if it can be called such, is purely incidental to the pur10
suit of those purposes, and is in no sense a distinct or external venture.
In subsequent decisions other courts have paid excessive respect to
the first clause of the sentence and disregarded the second."
8 263 U.S. at 582.
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 581.

11 See Comment, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YAsr L..

851, 853 (1951).
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In the Roche's Beach case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Judge Learned Hand dissenting, determined that a corporation organized by a testator to operate a public bathing beach for the
sole benefit of a charitable beneficiary, was an organization exempt
under the provision of the statute corresponding to Section 101 (6) of
the Code. Great reliance was placed upon the Trinidad case and the
intervening cases of Sand Springs Home v. Comm'r,'2 and Appeal of
3 which were said to hold that: "The destiUnity School of Christianity,:
nation of the income is more significant than its source." 4
The Court acknowledged that the exemption was the result of Congressional largess. But it felt that the words, "organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes . . . no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual," could reasonably be interpreted to encompass the feeder
as well as the charitable corporation. The Court continued:
No reason is apparent to us why Congress should wish to deny exemption
to a corporation organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable
purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if the corporation itself administers the charity.' 5
It is arguable that the Court failed to recognize that the Trinidad
case and the succeeding cases dealt with actual operating charities that,
incident to their purpose, carried on competitive or profitable business
activities. Judge Hand, in an opinion dissenting from that of the majority in the Roche's Beach case, adverted to the trifling extent of the
"business activity" involved in the Trinidad case and to its relation to
the activities of the order. He concluded prophetically: "But I believe
that when, however actuated, an exempt parent does resort to a business
subsidiary, any income so obtained becomes taxable."' 6
The Court in the Roche's Beach case had been able to place reliance
on the opinion of the Bureau itself, which (presumably as a result of
the Trinidad decision) held that:
A corporation formed to dispense charity which does not actually engage
in charitable undertakings itself but distributes its income to organizations
organized and operated exclusively for the purposes named in subdivision
231 [IRC 101(6)] is exempt from taxation under said
(6) of Section
7
section.
12 6 BT.A. 198 (1927).
13 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926).
14 96 F.2d at 778.
15 Id, at 779.
16 Ibid.
17 I.T. 1945, 111-I Cum. B~uL. 273 (1924).
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Following the Roche's Beach case, the Commissioner seemed to accept the proposition that feeder organizations were not taxable.'8 In
1942, however, he once again changed his mind and determined to
ignore that precedent. 19 The matter has been in litigation ever since
with different results in the various 'courts applied to and no definitive
resolution by the court of final appeal.
The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the proposition
that:
... the exemption from taxation granted by the statutes makes the destination of the income, that is, the purpose and object to which it is devoted, rather than its source, the ultimate test of its exemption.20
The doctrine is qualified by a requirement that the by-laws of the corporation must clearly reflect the charitable purposes to which the income is assigned and that these purposes be exclusive.'
It has been said that:
...
no one could organize a business corporation for the purpose of profit
and later make it exempt under § 101(6) by the simple expedient of
transferring its ownership to an exempt organization.P
However, such reorganization may be effected by the expedient of
amending the corporation's charter.23
Holding an opinion contrary to the Roche's Beach decision are several circuit courts and the United States Tax Court. The last tribunal
adheres to its decision rendered in Mueller v. Commissioner,2 4 in which,
after carefully considering the precedents and noting the distinction
mentioned above, the Court determined that the Mueller Macaroni
Company was taxable even though all its income was assigned to the
benefit of the law school of New York University. Judge Murdock,
speaking for the court, emphasized that:
One cannot say properly that a corporation was organized and operated
exclusively for educational purposes where, as here, one of its important
1

1938-39: G.C.M. 20853, 2 Cum. BurL.

166 (1938); 1939-40: G.C.M. 21610, 2 Cua.

BULL. 103 (1939); 1939-40: G.C.M. 22116, 2 Cur. BT.. 100 (1940).
19 1941-42: G.C.M. 23063, 1 Cum. BuLL. 103 (1942).
20 Sico v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 197, 199 (Ct. C(.1952). See Mueller v. Comm'r,

190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951); Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950).
21 Universal Oil Products v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950); Sun-Herald Corp.
v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947); Roche's Beach Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776
(2d Cir. 1938); Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1934).
22 Universal Oil Products v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 1950).
23 Wllingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950). But see Universal Oil
Products v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950). As to the time of "organization,"
see Sabastian Lathe Co. v. Johnson, (S.D.N.Y. November 29, 1952).
24 14 T.C. 922 (1950).
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purposes was to conduct a large commercial business for profit, competing
with other similar corporations all subject to tax, and where the operation
of that business is not merely incidental to the conduct by the same corporation of any other overshadowing exempting activity. The purpose to
aid the educational institution, regardless of its relative importance, is
not the25 exclusive purpose in the organization and operation of the petitioner.
The Tax Court holds to this opinion despite reversal of Mueller by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (after the passage of the
1950 Revenue Act).26
Although the Third Circuit rejected the Tax Court's reasoning, the
Fourth Circuit, in a careful decision reviewing the whole history of the
law, affirmed the Tax Court's determination that a corporation organized under the charitable corporation laws of South Carolina to operate a canteen, coal yard, filling station and appliance store for the
convenience of the employees of a textile manufacturer was taxable on
the income therefrom although all of the profits were destined to charitable organizations.2 7 The Court in its decision again emphasized "and
operated exclusively for charitable purposes." It is significant to note
that certiorari was denied in this case even though the Solicitor General filed a memorandum stating that the Government did not oppose
issuance of the writ.28
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY FOR A JUDICIAL ILL
In the early part of 1950, powerful lobbies were exerting pressure
on Congress to reduce or eliminate excise taxes. Since it was clear that
there would be a substantial loss of tax revenue, the legislature was
interested in developing new sources of income. Its attention was invited to so-called "loopholes" in the tax structure and particularly those
"loopholes" involving tax-exempt organizations.
In presenting the Treasury's position in testimony before the Ways
and Means Committee, Secretary Snyder recommended, in general
terms, legislation to counteract what he explained to be three specific
abuses of tax exemption. He noted first that:
The law has been interpreted by some courts to attach the exemption to
the destination of the income rather than its source. Some colleges and
other institutions are engaging in a wide variety of business undertakings,
25 Id. at 931-32.
26 Mueller v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). See Eastman v. Comm'r, 16 T.C.
1502 (1951) (automotive parts and service business profit inuring to Amherst College);
Donor Realty Corp., 17 T.C. 899 (1951).
27 United States v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951).

28 342 U.S. 932 (1952).
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including the production of such items as automobile parts, chinaware,
and 2food
products, and the operation of theatres, oil wells and cotton
9
gins.
The result was unfair competition.
The tax free status of these Section 101 organizations enables them to
use their profits tax free to expand operations, while their competitors
can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes 20
It was clear that the Secretary had in mind the Mueller case, which
was at that time under consideration by the Tax Court. The Government did not propose to ignore the challenge of Judge Holmes who a
few months before had written:
Over a period of thirty-six years, with opportunity to change but without changing, the intention of Congress has been to exempt from income
tax corporations organized and operated exclusively for the sole purpose
of devoting their net earnings to religious, charitable, and educational
purposes. If this intention is wrong from a legislative standpoint, the
courts should let changes in the law come from the legislative department.2 '
Secretary Snyder continued:
Advantage is also being taken of the exemption by the purchase of
rental properties with borrowed funds. In this type of operation the non
profit organization enjoys advantages over privately owned business which
is measured by the amount of the tax privately owned enterprise is required to pay. This advantage permits these institutions to apply a larger
portion of rental receipts to repayment of borrowed funds than is possible for a privately owned business paying income tax. The exemption
should be limited 2to income received from ordinary investments which
involves no abuse.
It seems that Mr. Snyder had in mind a particular transaction entered into by Union College and Allied Stores. 3 Union put up a nominal amount of money toward the purchase of virtually all of Allied's
real estate, borrowing millions from an insurance company to finance
the deal. As part of the agreement, Union released the property to
Allied at a rental barely sufficient to cover carrying charges and amortization. The Treasury was convinced that a taxable organization could
not have entered into such a contract. The seller was entitled to a ren29

Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950,

81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1950).
30 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1952).
31 Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1950).
32 Hearings, supra note 29, at 19.

z3 See Bloom, A Consideration of Lease-Backs under the 1950 Revenue Act, 31 B.U.
L. REv. 482 (1951); Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 696 (1950).
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tal deduction for amount not taxable to the purchasing institution,
which in truth was not using its own money. The scheme had a particular appeal to sellers who could take a loss on the sale. As a fillip,
the contract might grant the seller an option to repurchase.3 4 In fact,
the variety of advantages to the seller were infinite and the scheme
was being widely hawked to unwary institutions as "the most noteworthy financial device of the present century." 35
The third abuse to which the Secretary called the Committee's attention was the employment of tax-exempt foundations to maintain
control of businesses and avoid the estate tax. Although this problem is
outside the scope of the present discussion, it must be recognized that
the taxation of foundations has a substantial though indirect effect on
the income of colleges and universities.
Secretary Snyder summed up the Government's position as follows:
The correction of present abuses, which shift additional burdens to the
rest of the population, becomes essential for reasons of equity. This calls
for a solution which will eliminate the abuse but will not interfere with
the basic activities of these organizations.
To meet this problem, it is recommended that the income derived by
these institutions from the operation of businesses which are clearly unrelated to their primary functions be taxed at regular corporation income
tax rates. 30
Educational institutions were in the main opposed to granting tax
immunity to a business merely because its profits inured to the benefit of a tax-exempt institution. As a consequence, no serious effort was
made to oppose a change in the law that would give effect to Judge
Hand's dissent in the Roche's Beach decision. The colleges' representatives noted with approval that a simple amendment to Section 101 (14)
could effect this purpose insofar as it regarded independent subsidiary
corporations. It was suggested that an additional sentence be added
to Section 101(14) to make it read as follows:
(14) Corporations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title
to property, collecting income therefrom and turning over the entire
amount thereof less expenses to an organization which itself is exempt
from the tax imposed by this chapter; provided, however, that such corporation conducting a business not related to the purpose of the organization, which is itself exempt, shall not be exempt.3 7 (Italics supplied to in-

dicate suggested amendment.)

As regards businesses operated directly, the college representatives
34 See Bloom, supra note 33, at 489.
35 H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 30 at 38.
30 Hearings, supra note 29, at 19.
37 See INT. REv. CODE § 101 (14).
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noted the difficulty of determining which businesses were related and
which were not related, and fell back on Judge Hand's statement in
Roche's Beach v. Comm'r, which set forth the safeguards against educational institutions indulging in an excessive business activity.
The purpose of subdivision 14 was to tax all business income, however
destined, unless the company was really not in business at all. To some
extent it is indeed true that that purpose can be evaded; an exempt corporation may go into business not strictly germain to its charter powers
without losing its exemption. But there are several checks upon this possibility; first, the business must be small, if the corporation is to retain its
classification under its appropriate subdivision; second, in many cases it
will wince at exposing its funds to the hazards of business; third, its charter
will often forbid such excursions. 8
Insofar as leasebacks were concerned, the colleges noted that the
abuse was that of the seller who received, in addition to the sale price,
a lease having greater value than the rental payments would indicate.
They urged that taxing the seller on this benefit (or treating the whole
transaction as a mortgage) would be a substantial deterrent against the
use of this subterfuge for obtaining tax benefitsY 9
Despite the opposition of the universities and colleges as well as
other exempt institutions, the Ways and Means Committee without
hesitation adopted in toto the Treasury recomfmendations for the closing
of tax-exemption loopholes.4 0 The wide publicity given to New York
University's ownership of the Mueller Macaroni Company, to the University of Michigan's operation of the Willow Run Airport, and to the
Union College-Allied Stores agreement, served to override any objection made on the basis of reason or logic. The bill as presented to
the House4 included provisions taxing business activities, whether
directly or indirectly owned by exempt institutions. The Committee felt that the leaseback scheme was as much an abuse by the
tax-exempt institutions as it was on the part of the vendor-taxpayer,
and included a provision taxing exempt institutions on income from
the leased property that was purchased or improved with borrowed
money.
The House had expended considerable time in drafting and passing
the full recommended revision of the revenue law. By the time the
problem was turned over to the Senate, the organizations to be affected
were in a position to exert pressure on that body's Finance Committee.
88
39
40
41

96 F.2d at 779.
Note, 60 YAI, L. 3. 879 (1951).
H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 30, at 37.
H.R. 8920.
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For a while, it seemed as if the whole matter would be postponed until
the following session of Congress, since both the reduction of the excise
tax and the closing of loopholes involved controversial questions of
serious import in an election year.
The commencement of the Korean War resolved the issue precipitously.4 2 It was clear to Congress that taxes would have to be
raised immediately. The reduction of the excise tax was at once a
dead letter. The closing of loopholes seemed very politic, and the
Senate Finance Committee proceeded forthwith to adopt the House's
recommendations with few and minor changes.
Thus, with the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress resolved many of
the perplexing questions concerning the taxation of exempt organizations on their business activities. The problem of drafting such statute
had been exceedingly difficult, and it is clear that with the enactment
of the bill many new and complicated problems were brought before
the colleges and universities.
In 1951, Congress recognized that insofar as the colleges and universities are concerned, the taxation of feeder corporations for years prior
to the effective date of the 1950 Act was a problem in seething ferment.
As a consequence, it determined that feeder corporations of operating
colleges and universities and hospitals should not be taxed for years
prior to 1951."
THE STATUTE

Before we consider the statute itself and the regulations which became
effective August 28, 1952, with the approval of T.D. 5928 and its
publication in the Federal Register, it is pertinent to make several
general observations.
The section dealing with the tax-exempt status of foundations, as
such, specifically provides that it shall not apply in the case of
(2) an educational organization which normally maintains a regular
faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of
pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on. .... 45
In this and other ways, Congress has indicated a desire to treat operat42 SEN. Rz.p. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).
43 See Finkelstein, Tax Exempt Charitable Corporations: Revenue Act of 1950, 50
Mice. L. Rsv. 427 (1952); Eaton, Charities under the 1950 Revenue Act, 90 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 220 (1952).
44 Pub L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (Oct. 20, 1951).
45 INT. REV. CODE § 3813(a) (2).
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ing educational institutions as belonging to a specific class within the
46
category of tax-exempt organizations.
With regard to the regulations, it is interesting to note that they
are in the main taken word for word from the Committee Reports,
specifically the report of the Senate Finance Committee, since that body
deals last with tax bills. This practice has grown in recent years and
is a tribute to the workmanship of the Joint Committee Staff on Internal
Revenue Taxation, which is responsible for much of the actual drafting
of the bills and reports.
a. General
To effectuate Secretary Snyder's recommendations, Congress inserted
in the Code a special supplement that sets forth in three sections how
certain Section 101 organizations shall be taxed on their "business income". 47 This supplement was related to Section 101 by amending that
section to read: "Except as provided ...in supplement U the following
- 48
organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter- 1
(Emphasis added.)
and inserting at the end:
An organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade
or business for profit shall not be exempt under any paragraph of this
section on the ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more
organizations exempt under this section from taxation. For the purposes
of this paragraph the term "trade or business" shall not include the
rental by an organization of its real property .... 49
b. Tax and Organizations Taxable-Section 421
In Section 421, the first of Supplement U's three sections, Congress
spells out the amount of the tax and the organizations that shall be
subject to it.
It is interesting to note that although private colleges and universities
were taxable under the 1950 Act, state institutions were not. Until
modified by the 1951 Act, Section 421(b)(1) merely provided for the
taxation of "organizations exempt under Section 101(1), (6), (7) and
46 See INT. Rxv. CODE §§ 421(b) (1) (B), 422(a) (8)(A), also the last two sentences
of §§ 422(a) and 422(b)(2). See also Pub L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302
(Sept. 23, 1950), 64 Stat. 953, as amended by Pub. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess, § 601
(Oct. 20, 1951).
47 INT. REV. CODE Supp. U §§ 421, 422, 423. For an extensive review of the 1950
act, see Comment, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YAix L. J. 851
(1951). For a less detailed study, see Levin, Exempt Organizations and the 1950 Act,
29 TAxEs 882 (1951).
48 INT. REV. CODE § 101.
49 Ibid. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101-3(b) (1952).
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(14)." It was recognized at the time of the enactment of the 1950
statute that state universities and colleges were probably exempt under
Section 116(d) rather than under Section 101(6). In the haste which
surrounded the final enactment of the statute, it was argued that the
Federal Government could not constitutionally tax a university that
was owned and operated by a state. In retrospect, it is evident that the
Federal Government can tax a state educational institution on its income from clearly unrelated business activities.o Congress corrected
its error by adding subparagraph (B) to Section 421(b)(1), which
specifically adds state colleges and universities to the list of organizations taxable.5 '
c.

Unrelated Business Income-Section 422

Sections 422 and 423 spell out what is and is not unrelated business
income. Section 422 is concerned with the general definition of unrelated business income and some specific limitations thereto. In Section 423, Congress set forth in detail how an exempt organization is
to be taxed on its rental income from real property purchased with
borrowed money.
What is an "unrelated trade or business"? The statute defines it as
• . .any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially re-

lated (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds
or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance
by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or
function constituting the basis for its exemption under Section 101 (or,
in the case of an organization described in Section 421(b) (1) (B), [state
college or university] to the exercise or performance of any purpose or
function described in Section 101(6))

. . .52

Note that the taxable unrelated business net income is
• . .the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated

trade or business (as defined in subsection (b)) regularly carried on by it
less the deductions allowed by Section 23 which are directly connected
with the carrying on of such trade or business.
.3
(Emphasis added.)
Thus,
. . .in determining whether the income of an exempt organization from

a trade or business is subject to the Supplement U tax, it is first necessary

GO New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); South Carolina v. United States,,
199 U.S. 437 (1905).
61 Sari. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 57 (1951); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.421-4(a) (2) (1952).
52 INT. REv. CODE § 422(b).
M3 Id. at § 422(a).
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to determine whether it is income from a- trade or business
which is regu4
larly carried on, or is income from a sporadic activity.P
If a college gives an occasional dance or operates a sandwich stand
during reunion or an annual fair, the income from such activity is not
taxable. 5 But a sporadic activity may be "regularly carried on" within
the meaning of the statute if it is conducted with "sufficient consistency
to indicate a continuing purpose of the organization to derive some
of its income from such activity."'5 6 The operation of a parking lot
one day a week or of a race track one week a year would amount to the
regular conduct of a business.5 7
The relation of the business (or lack of it) to the exercise or performance by an organization of its educational purpose is a much
more perplexing question. The operation of a wheat farm by an agricultural college would, ordinarily be related business. 58 But (in one
of the few instances in which the regulations go beyond the committee
reports) the Bureau notes that the operation must not be on a scale
disproportionately large when compared with the educational program
of the college.
Incidental use of a trade or business by a tax-exempt organization
will not relate it to the functions of the organization. For example,
students performing clerical or bookkeeping functions of a business
as a part of their educational program do not necessarily relate that
5 9
business to the activities of the educational institution.
The Senate Report expressly states that athletic activities of schools
are substantially related to their educational functions: "For example,
a university would not be taxable on income derived from a basketball
tournament sponsored by it, even where the teams were composed of
' 60
students of other schools."
Three specific exceptions are noted to the definition of unrelated
trade or business.6 The term does not include a trade or business in
which substantially all the work is performed without compensation.
As an example, the report and regulations cite the operation of a
second-hand clothing store by an exempt orphanage in which the work
is performed by volunteers. The production of a play by a volunteer
54 SEx. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42 at 106.
55 Ibid.
56 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-3(a)(3) (1952).
57 SEN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42 at 107.
58 Ibid; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-3(a)(3) (1952).
59 SEN. REP., ibid; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-3(a)(3)
60 SEN. REP., id. at 29.
61 INT. REV. CODE § 422(b)(1), (2) and (3).

(1952).
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student drama group would probably come within this exemption. In
subparagraph (2), Congress excepted from the definition a business
carried on by certain organizations (including colleges and universities)
primarily for the convenience of its "members, students, patients,
officers, or employees." The Committee had in mind the operation of
a laundry by a college for the purpose of laundering dormitory linen
and clothing of the students. A third exception noted is a trade or
business which consists of selling merchandise, substantially all of
which has been received by the organization as gifts or contributions.
According to the report, this provision was enacted to remove thrift
shops from the application of the Act.6 2
In Section 422(a), Congress carefully spells out some specific exclusions from unrelated business income, most of which come within
the general category of investment income. Thus, there are excluded
dividends, interest and annuities; 6 royalties;m rents from real property
including personal property rented with real property;65 gains (or
losses) from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property (other
than stock in trade or other property of a kind which would properly
be includible in inventory or property held primarily for sale to custom-'
ers in the ordinary course of a trade or business):
Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses and
similar items are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated income
because your committee believes that they are "passive" in character and
are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having
similar income. Moreover, investment-producing incomes of these types
source of revenue for educational
have long been recognized as a proper 66
and charitable organizations and trusts.
There is further excluded from unrelated business income any income from research performed for the United States, federal agencies
and instrumentalities, or for states or political subdivisions of states.6 7
A similar exclusion applies to income from research performed by an
organization operated primarily for the purposes of fundamental research, the results of which are freely available to the general public.68
Specific provisions are included setting forth the treatment to be
62 SEN. REP. No. 2375, note 42 supra at 107, 108; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-3

(b) (1952).
,03 INT. REv. CODE § 422(a) (1).
64 Id. at § 422(a) (2).

6 Id. at § 422(a) (3).
66 Id. at § 422(a) (5); SEN. Rx.
67 INT. REV.

68 Id. at

§

CODE § 422(b) (7).

422(a) (8)(C).

No. 2375, sopra note 42 at 30, 31.
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afforded net operating losses, 9 and charitable contributions, 70 which
in the case of an unrelated business must be made to beneficiaries other
71
than the owning exempt institution.
In the case of a college, university or hospital there is "excluded
all income derived from research performed for any person". 72 This
section was added by the Finance Committee in Executive Session
with little explanation in the Report. 73 In his regulations, the Commissioner, after stating the law, attempts to fix some limits on the term
"research" as used in Section 422(a). The term, he says,
...does not include activities of a type ordinarily carried on as an incident to commercial or industrial operations. For example, the ordinary
testing or inspection of materials or
products or the designing or construc74
tion of equipment, buildings, etc.

Just what these words really mean is not quite clear.75 The individual
who drafted the regulations is no longer with the Bureau and is, therefore, not available for comment. It is demonstrable that research organizations operating for profit exerted pressure on the Bureau to restrict the definition of research in order to prevent the universities and
foundations from carrying on certain activities.
Subsection (iv) is one of those few places in the regulations under
Supplement U where the Bureau goes beyond parrotting the law or the
Finance Committee Report. Possibly it represents an attempt by the
Bureau to limit the word "research" to a narrower meaning than
Congress intended. It might be used to restrict the exclusion of the
statute in the case of research by a college, university or hospital to
research related to the purposes of the university.
Under the law and regulations a university's operation of an ordinary
commercial testing laboratory would not be considered "research".
With this proposition one would hardly disagree, but a real problem is
posed by the phrase, "or the designing or construction of equipment,
buildings, etc." There may be an activity "of a type ordinarily carried
on as an incident to commercial or industrial operations" involving "the
designing or construction of equipment, buildings, etc.," which is research in the ordinary meaning of that word. Should a university, for
instance, assimilate a commercial laboratory that is in the business of
69 Id. at § 422(a) (6).
70 Id. at § 422(a) (9).
71 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-1(b)(6)(vi) (1952).
72 INT. REV. CoDE § 422(a) (8) (A).
73 See SEN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42, at 30, 109.
74 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-1(b) (6) (iv) (1952).
75 See Finkelstein, supra note 43, at 430, and Eaton, supra note 43, at 222.

TAXING THE COLLEGES

testing fire extinguishers and use its facilities, under a contract with
a private concern, to discover a better kind of fire extinguant, it is
arguable that under the law the income would be excluded from unrelated business income. Yet the regulations could be used to deny this
exclusion.
The legislative history shows that Congress had in mind a rather
broad meaning of the word "research". This intention follows from
the inclusion of a specific provision for organizations engaged in "fundamental research". This latter provision was added by Senate-House
Conferees after the bill had passed both bodies and is traceable to a
paragraph in the Senate Report that reads as follows:
A special exemption is provided under your committee's bill in the case
of colleges, universities, and hospitals for income received from research
done for anyone. This is not intended to imply, however, that funds
received for research by other institutions necessarily represent unrelated
business income. For example, a grant by a corporation to a foundation
to finance scientific research would be a gift rather than trade or business
income (either related or unrelated) if the results of the research were
to be made freely available to the public. However, a "grant" by a corporation to be used for research by a foundation with the results of the
research to be given only to the grantor would clearly not be a gift and
would constitute unrelated business income. 6
(It is patent from the above that Congress intended that the result of
the research done by a college, university or hospital need not be freely
available to the general public.)
As indicated above, the exemption of research by colleges, universities
and hospitals was added by the Senate to the House Bill. At the same
time, the Senate Committee changed the exclusion in the case of research for the United States, etc., to read "work" instead of research
"because it was pointed out to the Committee that Government contracts given to universities frequently provide for development and
instruction as well as research.17 7 The House accepted the addition

of the special provision for colleges on the condition that the exclusion
with reference to contracts with the United State's be changed back
to "research." From this it is reasonably inferrable that "research"
does not include development in the commercial sense of the word."
With the foregoing reservation, it is arguable that the whole shows
76

SEN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42 at 30.

77 Ibid.
78 Air Force Reg. 80-4 (Mar. 1, 1949), defines "applied research" as follows:

To apply scientific personnel, facilities and knowledge to specific problems which
arise from military requirements for new and improved concepts, techniques and
material to a point where a definite outline of the path in development or other
application is indicated.
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an intent that the word "research" be broadly not narrowly defined.
The House Ways and Means Committee in dealing with the problem
initially stated: "'Research' would include not only fundamental research but also applied research such as testing and experimental construction and production."" (Emphasis added.) It is certainly clear
that the exclusion in the case of a college, university or hospital should
not be limited to activities which are related and which would therefore
be excluded under other provisions of the Act.
Relief Provisions in the 1951 Act
In 1951 Congress inserted at the end of 422(a) and at the end
of 422(b) two relief provisions for the benefit of specific educational
institutions that found themselves in difficulty because of the 1950
Act. Both provisions were inserted as a result of amendment from
the floor of the Senate and any explanation, therefore, is to be found
in the conference committee report in the Revenue Act of 1951.0
The regulations are pointedly silent.8 ' The first provision permits a
partnership of colleges and universities operating an unrelated business
organization to deduct from their unrelated business income that portion which they were required by written contract, executed prior to
January 1, 1950, to pay in discharge of the indebtedness that they
incurred in acquiring their share of the business. The second provision
added at the end of 422 (b), was enacted to permit Wesleyan University
to integrate its publishing business within three years.
d.

Leases under Supplement U-Section 423

Section 422 (a) (4) specifically provides that Supplement U lease income shall be included as unrelated business income. It will be remembered that the Supplement U lease provision has to do with leasebacks and was intended to tax exempt institutions on that portion
of the rent received from leased property which is reasonably allocable
to the indebtedness that the institution incurs to purchase or improve
the property.82
Parenthetically, it should be observed that in the regulations the
Commissioner reserves to himself a right to determine whether a pay79 H.R. RUP. No. 2319, supra note 30 at 37.
80 See Summary of the Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951 (H.R. 4473) as agreed
to by the conferees, prepared by the staff of the joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation (Oct. 1951) at pages 20 and 21.
81 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-2(b) (1952) ; INu. REv. CoDE § 422(a) (3).
82 See Bloom, supra note 33.
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ment is actually "rent" or not. Thus, despite the general rule that
rent is excepted-a rule stated twice in the statutess---a payment designated as rent might be included in unrelated business income of a university if it were, in fact, a return or a share of profits in the business
operating the "rented" property. 4 Thus, income derived from the
operation of a hotel would not be rental income although income from
the lease of a hotel would be. 5
In defining a Supplement U lease, Congress was obviously constrained
to make the terms as liberal as possible to the tax-exempt institutions.
To be included a lease must run for a term in excess of five years. The
statute is drawn to include leases that actually run for more than this
period whether or not the initial agreement so provides. A lease that
is substantially related to the performance by the educational institution
of its charitable purposes is likewise excluded. The example given is
of a hospital leasing a clinic to an association of doctors."6 It is also
provided that an organization occupying a building may lease part
of the premises without considering the imposition of I.R.C. 423.7
As a final general exception, it was provided that the section will not
apply unless the rents derived from such leases represent more than
fifty percent of the total rents, or the area occupied under such leases
is more than fifty percent of the total area. However, if one tenant or
a group of tenants pays more than ten percent of the rents or occupies
more than ten percent of the total area the income from that particular
lease will be taxable under Supplement U. As in the case of general
rents, personal property leased with the real estate is to be lumped
with it in applying Section 423.8

For a lease to be subject to 423, the institution must have incurred
an indebtedness either before or after acquiring or improving the
property for the purpose of acquiring or improving the property. If
such an indebtedness exists, then a proportionate part of the rental
income is included as unrelated business income, the proportion being
the ratio of the indebtedness to the adjusted tax basis of the property.8°
The committee reports and the regulations make it clear that substance not form is determinative. If acquisition (or improvement) is
83
84
85
86
87
88

See the next to last paragraph of INT. REV. CODE § 101, and § 422 (a) (3).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.422-1(b) (1952).
Id. at § 29.422(b) (3) (ii) ; SEN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42, at 108.
SEN, REP., id. at 111; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.423-1(c)(1) (1952).
SEx. REP., id. at 33.
See INT. REV. CODE § 423(a).

89 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,

29.423-3

(1952).
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in any way traceable to an institution's debt then that indebtedness
comes under the statute:
The rules respecting Supplement U leases cover cases where the leased
property itself is not mortgaged. They are intended, for example, to reach
cases such as the following: A university pledges some of its investment
securities with a bank for a loan which is used to purchase a building
that is leased for a long term. This would be an example of a Supplement U lease indebtedness incurred prior to the acquisition of the property. If the building itself were later mortgaged to raise funds to release
the pledged securities, the lease would continue to be a Supplement U
lease. Likewise, if a scientific organization mortgages its laboratory to
replace working capital used in remodeling another building, otherwise
free of indebtedness and leased for a long term to a grocery store chain,
the lease would be a Supplement U lease inasmuch as the indebtedness,
incurred subsequent to the improvement of such property, would not have
been incurred but for such improvement and the incurrence of the indebtedness was reasonably forseeable at the time of such improvement,
since the organization knew it must have working capital to continue
current operations.0
It is irrelevant that the property is acquired by gift, devise or purchase if it is in fact subject to an indebtedness. To prevent undue
hardship from the application of this last provision, the statute specifies
that, where property was acquired by gift, devise or bequest prior to
July 1, 1950, subject to a mortgage or lease requiring improvements,
neither the mortgage nor the indebtedness incurred to improve the
property in accordance with the terms of the lease shall be subject to
Supplement U. The same relief is granted a Section 101(14) corporation
acquired prior to the same date provided that at least a third of the
stock of such corporation was acquired by gift or bequest.
The statute permits deducting the same proportion of taxes, interest
and a reasonable allowance for depreciation or obsolence as is applied
to the rents. It is to be noted that only these specific deductions are
allowed. Where only a part of the property is subject to the lease, an
allocation of rent and deductions is provided for.91
e.

Consolidation
The Act provides for the consolidation of all of an organization's income from its various unrelated trade or business activities. "To do
otherwise would deny to the organization the benefit now enjoyed by
ordinary corporations of offsetting losses on one venture against the
gains on another." 92
90 SEN. RE. No. 2375, supra note 42, at 112; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.423-2 (1952).
id. at § 29.423-4.
92 SEN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42, at 30, 115; U.S. Treas. Regs., id. at § 29.423-4(b).
91 U.S. Treas. Reg.
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CONCLUSION

Abuse and calumny have been heaped upon the sections of the3
Revenue Act of 1950 that affect the tax status of exempt institutions .
Insofar as the criticism relates to the complexity of the law, the objections are warranted. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged
that the statute hardly represents an unreasonable imposition on the
institutions involved.
In some instances educational institutions may find it very difficult
to determine whether activities are exempt or come within the purview
of the statute. The problem of research noted above is likely to be one
of the most perplexing. In general, however, it will not be difficult
for an institution to restrict its activities to those not penalized under
the statute.
The punishment imposed by Section 423 with regard to Supplement
U leases is probably more severe than the nature of the crime requires.
In certainty, the section is unnecessarily complicated and involved.
Moreover, it hardly seems fair that a university should have to include
in its unrelated business income a portion of the rent received on real
property given or bequeathed the university subject to a mortgage.
So far as the vendor lessee of property sold subject to a leaseback
is concerned, his problem may be just beginningf 4 The Commissioner
will undoubtedly contend that the transactions are in the nature of a
mortgage loan particularly where an option to repurchase is involved. 5
Where the lease is for a period in excess of 30 years, the transaction
will be subject to I.R.C., Section 112(b)(1) and Reg. 111, Section
29.112 (b) (1).96

It is probable that the courts in interpreting the statute will continue
to be lenient in their treatment of tax-exempt institutions, particularly
colleges and universities. In this regard it is interesting to note the
opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Squire v. Students Book Corp." In
determining that a corporation owned by a state college which operated
a book store and restaurant on the college campus was exempt from
federal taxation, Judge Healy first stated that the court would follow
Eaton, supra note 43.
04 SFN. REP. No. 2375, supra note 42, at 110.
95 Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939). See also Higgins v. Smith, 308
U.S. 473, 477 (1940); Watson v. Comm'r, 124 F.2d 437, 439 (2d Cir. 1942).
96 Century Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 581 (1950) (taxpayer was denied loss on
sale of foundry to William Jewell College where the college executed a leaseback for
a term of 95 years).
97 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
93
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Roche's Beach. He then observed that Congress had declared a different rule applicable for taxable years commencing after 1950. The
Judge continued,
Resolution of the case before us does not depend wholly on the ultimate destination of the taxpayer's profits. The business enterprise in
which the taxpayer is engaged obviously bears a close and intimate
relationship to the functioning 'of the College itself. In some of the cases
adhering to the general rule no similar relationship is discernible. 98
What of the possibilities of new and more restrictive legislation?
In times such as these when the nation is in desperate need of revenue,
any transaction which smacks of unfair tax advantage is likely to invoke
legislative sanction. It is demonstrable that legislation in the field
of tax exemption has stemmed from a few specific transactions which
achieved sufficient notoriety to attract the attention of Congress. Mr.
Little's dealings with the Textron Foundation, New York University's
ownership of Mueller Macaroni Company, and Union College's transaction with Allied Stores may be followed directly to the Revenue Act
of 1950. If similar schemes are developed Congress's reaction is likely
to be sharp and possibly extreme. It is not exaggerating to say that
there is a fear abroad in the land that the tax laws encourage concentration of wealth and property in the hands of exempt institutions. 9
Nonetheless, if the colleges in good faith observe the spirit of the
1950 Act, there is little likelihood that further revision of the laws will
be required in the near future. The overwhelming majority of these
institutions have in the past scrupulously avoided any questionable
transactions and it is predictable that in future activity they will be
even more circumspect.
98 Id. at 1020.
99 See Finkelstein, supra note 43; H.R. RE'. No. 2319,

supra note 30, at 39.

